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,,t ift-Responrlent,
Case No. 19150

[1efendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals from jury verdicts finding him
guilty of Aggravated Burglary, a first-degree felony,
violation of Utah Code Ann.

~

76-2-203 (1953), as amended,

NJqravatecl Robbery, a first-degree felony,
~

in

in violation of

76-6-302 ( 1953), as amended, and Theft, a second-degree

fPlony,

in violation

of~

76-6-404 (1953), as amended.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Aµpellant
the Tl,ird Judicial.
c,t,-,1- c,f
1-:..·

lit

was tried by jury on March 10-11, 1983, in
District Court

in and for Salt Lake County,

ah, tbe Honorable Dean E. Conder presiding.

,.,, - c;r'1•tenced on March 2g, 1983.
,,,

1,--

On the aggravated

w.-,,-, se,1t enced to an indeterminate term

years nor more than life in the Utah
"-'

irtsc,n.

nn the aggravated robbery conviction, he was

also sentenced to five years to life
He was

sentencr-"ci

conviction.

tlJ

one

The thrcr-

r_n

f1ft(:.pn

in the rJtah State> Prison.

vear.s

the>

th<'ft

ntrl•_.re.-l tn run

vn,rP

s0ntPnC't'-::'S

on

concurrently.

RELIFF SOUGHT ON APPFAL
Respondent

seeks an affirmance of the appellant's

convictions and sentences.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On December 15, 1980, Bert Holland answered the
doorbell at about 10 p.m.
(T.

39).

at his home in Salt Lake City, Utah

Two men in their twenties asked for

not at the home (T. 40).

someone who was

One of the men pulled a gun out his

coat, the two men entered the house, and they ordered Holland
to call his wife into the room (T. 40).

They taped Mr.

Holland's hands and feet with duct tape as he lay on the floor
( T.

41).

They ordered Lorna Holland to lie on top of her

husband and they also taped her hands (T.
One of the men stayed
Hollands,

looked

took her werldin')

in the same room with the

into a closet, went
rinqs from h»r

41).

through Lorna's purse and

finqer

(T. 41, fiS).

The other

man had gone upstairs to a herlruorn anrl came hack down with
bedding, which he threw ove>t th•' to1• nf fl»rr
which completely covered them

(T,

41,

F.4).

anrl Lnrna anr1

Thr· llollanrls thereafter could not
1"

tl11·m searchinq

.ir

".h·

i

f,n

see the two men

throughout the home (T. 41. 64).

"s'"'lC papers" but the f!ollanrls dirl not

The
know

They asked for
ti"· 1cc.111hi11ation to a

safe, which the Hollands gave them, and

they also askerl about gold,

silver anrl jewelry (T. 43-44).

Tf,0 .1ssailants took rings, necklaces, jewelry, a shotgun, a
war ch ancl silver coins
about

Sl,000

(T.

46).

(T. 46).

The property was valued at

The two men apparently had not

what they were initially looking for
were at the Hollands'

home (T.

43,

found

in the 15 minutes they

66).

They placed a couch

on top of Lorna and Bert Holland and left the home (T. 45,
Ii r,) •

The Hollanrls gave a description of the assailants to
the

investigating officers.

There were no other witnesses,

nor

were fingerprints rliscovered at the scene (T. 81).
On December 22, 1980, Detective Daryle Ondrak of the

Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office showerl about 50 photographs
of

inrlivirluals to Bert and Lorna Holland but no positive

iclentification of the two assailants was made at that time (T.
4'!-Sfl,
1-10n·

6R, 81).

not

Photographs of appellant and James Nix Rafal

inclurlecl in that photograph book (T. 82).
In November

I

11WllJ•iinq a[)pc>llant ancl cTames Nix Rafal

I" d e ; ,

•,1~"'

.,r

it

i

1w;

'1»11.rnds

1981, the investigation led to several

•1u0st inn0.1 and he provirled rletailed accounts

ct imes,

(T.

(T. 84).

including those committerl aqainst the

88-89).

-3-

A photographic rlisplay,
six men, was preparerl by Salt
in March 1982 (T.
Idaho Falls,
Holland

Lak<· Cnt1nty Shccriff's

It was sent

83).

Idaho, where

(T. 83).

coritainin1 six pi,'t1Jres nf

tn pnl ice <let rcct ive:;

it was shown to Rert

1n

and Lorna

Bert made a positive identification of

photograph number 1 (James Nix Rafal)
as sa i l ant s

d••tf·ct i:""

as one of the

He also choose photographs 4 and fi

(T• 55 , 92 ) .

(Robert Taylor and appellant, respectively), either of which
he thought may have been the other assailant
Lorna Holland,

(T.

55, 92).

in a separate identification session,

was shown the same display of six

photographs (T.

fi9).

She

selected photograph 4 as representing one of the assailants
(T.

69, 93).

Photograph 4 depicted Robert Taylor, who

apparently was not

involved with the crimes (T.

q4).

Mr. and 'lrs. Holland positively identified appellant
as one of the assailants at the preliminary hearing and at
trial

(T.

46,

'i3-54,

67-72, 93-04).

Out of the presence of the jury, defenrlant mane a
motion to dismiss the theft count
defense had rested

(T.

217).

after both the State and

The motion apparently was denied

but there is no further rliscussion of it
transcript.
count

at

in the trial

Defense counsel aJain moverl to rlismiss the theft

sentencing

(T.

270).

Conder without explanation (T.

The mnt ion was rlenierl by

~udqe

270).

Appellant was thereafter

cnnvic·tl°rl of a']qravated

robbery, aggravated burC] lary and t hPft.

-4-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT'S SEPARATE CONVICTION OF THEFT
Wl\S PROPER BECAUSE THEFT IS NOT A LESSER
I~CLUDED OFFENSE OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY.
On arpeal, appellant contends that the trial judge
erred by not dismissing the theft charge because it is a
lPsser
trial

inclurled offense of aggravated robbery, and that the
judge erred at sentencing because the theft convict ion

merged into the aggravated robbery conviction.

He claims that

rroof of the elements of aggravated robbery also proves a
theft and, therefore, he cannot be convicted of both crimes.
Appellant challenges the theft conviction and seeks a
dismissal of that conviction and sentence.
A.
The statutory elements of theft are
different than the statutory elements of
aggravated robbery, and are not
necessarily included in the offense of
aggravated robbery.
The standards for determining when an offense is a
lesser included offense of another were recently explained in
_s_t_<:_t_e__v_._~a_k_e_r_, Utah, No.

1824'i (filed September 21, 1983).

When the prosecution requests a jury instruct ion on lesser
included offenses, the proper stanc'lard requires "a comparison
of the statutory elements of the offenses in the abstract."
H,,

slip op. at

i 11q r •rct ion on

2.

lesser

When the defendant requests a jury
included offenses, the proper standard

-5-

"requires an analysis of the

0virl~nce

criminal violatinns, the

( 1,dt

prn~

offererl at trial."

m11st

i()fl

cn11 1 1ily

"narrower" standatrl, a

r_

the various offenses.

l\t the t im0 ,, er iminal

filed,
fact

1

the prosecution clo0s n11t

be admittecl at trial, or

than one conviction, or
will give the evidence.

what

th0

l)t

•1!1)!.Jt1snn

st

Irl.

wilh thP

n.t ulnry Plf:>rnont'>

!if

information is

know what evidence will

in

if the eviclence supports more
interpretation the trier of fact

Thus, the prosecution at that point

must comply with the standard which compares the statutory
elements of the crimes.

When the prosecution

co~pares

the

statutory elements of the crime and concludes that one crime
is not

a lesser includecl offense of another, then the

prosecution should be allowed to charge the defendant with
violating each of the offenses.
'!'he standard which compares the abstract statutory
elements of the offenses states that

"[t J he lesser offense

must be a necessary element of the <Jreater offense and must o'
necessity be embraced within the

legal definition of the

gr eat er offense and be a pa i:t there of."
Utah 2 3,

3 6 , 3 3 P.

2d fi 4 0, 6 4 5 ( 1934 ) •

13 Utah 2d 195, 198,

371 P.:>'1 27,

29

~-a_t_e__v_.__~o_o_l_m~~,

In State v. Ri:ennan,

-----------------

(1962),

this Court set

forth the requirements of an incl uclcd of fenso as
Tht>

incluclecl

offense

rule as to w!,r=n

in ar·,rithrt

inc]uriPs a

i~,

011F

that

lr-?:-;s~r

R4

of fcnsr•

is

thP 111eater

(Jnc

w~V'tl

establishment of thP rpPatPT wnuUl
necessarily incl udr· pr1)1;f <Jf all th0

follows:

elements necessary to prove the lesser.
Conversely, it is only when proof of the
lesser offense requires some element not
involved in the greater offense that the
lesser would not be an included offense.
[Footnote omitted.]
"rwcessarily included offense," or statutory comparison of

1'1,,

the elements, standard has been codified in Utah Code Ann.
~

77-35-~l(e)(l953)

as amended:

The jury may return a verdict of
guilty to the offense charged or to any
offense necessarily included in the
offense charged or an attempt to commit
either the offense charged or an offense
necessarily included therein.
Utah Code Ann.

~

76-1-402(5)(1953), as amended, also refers to

necessarily included offenses:
If the district court on motion after
verdict or judgement, or an appellate
court on appeal or certiorari, shall
determine that there is insufficient
evidence to support a conviction for the
offense charged but that there is
sufficient evidence to support a
conviction for an included offense and the
trier of fact necessarily found every fact
required for conviction of that included
offense, the verdict or judgment of
conviction may be set aside or reversed
and a judgment of conviction entered for
the included offense, without necessity
of a new trial, if such relief is sought
by the defendant.
Under the "necessarily included offense" standard,
the determination of whether theft is a lesser included
offense within the crime of aggravated robbery requires an
0

xirn1ination of the respective elements of those crimes.
l'rn<nts
't.

c1t

h-Hl}

The

aqc3ravated robbery as defined in Utah Code Ann.
(1951), as amended, are:

-7-

( l I
t>t:·· L v
tohtli:::_:>r'/
ra

I 0[1

)ITilfl l t \

I 1-,,

l I
IH'·

"

1

a firearm.
or a clecid 1
(b I

f ,,

a,_,

df J<
:-;1

,., 1

1 nr

l

fdc·:;i:ni l<'

I"

of

a

,,f
kn i f ,.

Jfl;

S'._ r l ,-

1

1.:,

(3)
For tlw f'Uti•J'P nt this part, an
act shal 1 he neerne<l t" ''" "in the course
of cornrnitt in J a r(j\,t.1•t y" if il occurs in
an attempt to commit, rluring the
com'l\issinn of, ,-,r iri the immerliate flight
after the attempt or commission of a
robbery.
Robery is clef ined in Utah Code Ann. ~ 7()-6-301 ( 1953), as
1

amended, as:

tl-ie unlawful and
Il l
intentional ta>.1ng of personal property,
in the possession of another from his
person, or immediate> presence, against his
will, accomplished by means of force or
fear,

These elements of

robbery were qiven in

a0gr~vated

substantially the sa'l\e f:)rrn to the
23

(R.

108, 117).

The Plements of theft
~

jury in Instructions 17 and

as defined in Utah Code Ann.

7 6- 6- 4 0 4 ( 19 5 J \ , as ame no e d , are :
A. person rnmrnit.s thc>ft if he
or exercises unauthorized control
over the propertv of another with a
purpnse tn neptl~P him thereof.
obtain~

In the

instant

reasonably cone] une at

easi.:=-·

th··

t

i:111·

the pr osec ut ion could
ci

i

11f1ir

mnt ion was filed that

.,,,. nf a.1·1tavatecl robbery
because the

statutory'

r-"1f::irnentc-

elements reC)uired f.:.n
not reguiren foi

proof ,,r tli••f;

11f-

r!1lf"r~-,nt.

There are t hlf

"" ';" of committing robbery, the taking must be accomplished
i

•Jf

r1•;

, " ' '' ,,,

force or

knife or

fear,

and the actor must have used a

facsimile of the same or a deadly weapon or

1,.,,,,, car1srcc1 serious boclily injury upon another.
There are two adclitional elements required for
ptorlf of theft that are not required for proof of aggravatecl
One clif ference

is that obtaining control with the

purpose to deprive is an essential element of theft.

The

purpose to deprive required by the theft statute is a more
specific kincl of intent which goes beyond the intent required
for
~

aggravatecl robbery.

An intentional taking is required by

7n-6-301, the robbery statute, which is incorporated by

reference in the aggravated robbery statute.
dPfinecl in Utah Code Ann.

E;

76-2-103(1)

Intentionally is

(1953), as amendecl,

as:

A person engages in conduct:
( 1)
Intentionally, or with intent or
wilfully with respect to the nature of his
conduct or to a result of his conduct,
when it is his conscious objective or
desire to engage in the conduct or cause
the result.
Sc<' also:

,Jury Instruction Number 11 (R. 102).
Theft requires that the taking be with the "purpose

tri

deprive," which is defined in Utah Code Ann. Ii> 76-6-401(3)

!Jqr,1),

ac; amendecl, as having:

-9-

(e )
. t he cons c i <111 c; '1li i el' t :
(a) To withl1<Jlrl ptUJ><'rty perm,1nently
or for so extenrlecl a P'-'r incl or to usP
uncler such cirr:umstilnc<>s th.1\ a
suhstantial rortion of its pcnnomic value,
or of the use ancl henefit th0reof, would
be lost; or
(b )
To restore t he pt ope rt y on 1 y
upon payment of a reward or other
compensation; or
(c)
To dispose of the property uncler
circumstances that make it unlikely that
the owner will recover it.

Jury Instruct ion Number

See also:

The "purpose to deprive"

25

( R.

121-122).

is a culpahle mental state

required as an essential element of the crime of theft and

is

by definition more specific than the intentional, knowing or
reckless mental state generally required by the Utah Criminal
Code.

Where the allegecl lesser included offense requires

proof of a more specific
included relationship.

intent,

it cannot

_s_t_ate_ _y_.__~c:_i,_ri_EC_,

stanc1

Utah,

in the lesser

618 P. 2d 33

(1980), State~.__~t:_~~~~~, Utah, 621 P.2cl 1288 (1980), ~t__~t__~
~.___'l'_uc~e_i:_,

Utah, 618 P.2d 46 (1980).

Thus, the appellant can

be guilty of the "greater" offense (aggravated robhery)
without also committing the "lesser" crime
"Purpose to rleprive"
requirerl

(theft).

is an element of theft which

is

in addition to proof that the person Acted

intentionally or knowin<Jly.
however, an element

The

"purpose to deprive"

of ag'_lravalte--l ro!Jbioty an<l

it

is not,

is not

embraced within the legal clef in it ion of a'J'lt avatecl robbery.
Theft
theft

also differs fr()m dcJJtil"at el robbery because

requires that the value of thio rr--ipert y he proved as an

-ln-

, l"lll'cnt to determine if the crime is a second-degree felony,
, , ,1.

i0,1r<>e felony, class A misdemeanor or a class

'",, l<·m»anor.

-~t-~t_e__v_.__I,_l:!_<:_e_r_e>_,

B

28 Utah 2d 61, 498 P.2d 350

AgC)ravated robbery does not require that the value of

( 1 y 72).

the property be established.
Utah, 5q7 P.2d 1333 (1979).

Sta_t_EC__~l'!__!_l'!_t_ere~t_-~_13_._2:_B_._,

Because value does not have to be

proved for aggravated robbery, value is an additional element
of theft.
Theft is also not a lesser included offense of
aggravated robbery because an attempt will suffice for
conviction of aggravated robbery, while theft requires a
completed act.

An

"unlawful and intentional taking" is

required for committing robbery.

However, an intentional

taking of personal property in the possession of another need
not be proved for aggravated robbery.

This is because the

completed act of robbery (the intentional taking) is not
required; an attempt to commit robbery is sufficient.

Section

76-6-302 states in pertinent part:
(1) A person commits aggravated
robbery if ~_!: he__£_o_urse~com_m_i_!:_!:_i_~
_i:_o_bbEC_r_x,

i l'rnt,f•,,'-'

i

c;

(3)
For the purposes of this part, an
act shall be deemed to be "in the course
of committing a robbery" if it occurs in
an attempt to commit, during the
commission of, or in the immediate flight
after the attempt or commission of the
robbery.
arlded.)
"In the course of committing robbery" is

not a completed act, and it is different from the completed
act

of "obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the
-11-

property of another" for the crime of theft.
~

IJt

ah Cod<> Ann.

76-64-404 (1953), as amendecl.
Under~

attempt

76-4-101(1), a rerson is quilty nf ari

if:
[Alcting with the kincl of
culpability otherwise required for the
commission of the offense, he engages in
conduct constituting a substantial step
toward commission of the offense.

Because the completed act, and "unlawful ancl intentional
taking," is required for robbery, theft may be arguecl to be a
lesser included offense of robbery.

However, under the

attempt theory, no actual taking of property needs to be
proved for aggravated robbery.
Theft does require a completed act, specifically
that the person "obtains or exercises unauthorized control."
Therefore, theft requires an element which is not required for
aggravated robbery when aggravated robbery is proved under the
attempt theory.
The result is that theft is not necessarily and not
at all times a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery.
Because the crime of theft in the abstract contains more
elements than aggravatecl robbery, theft cannot be a lesser
included offense of aggravatecl robbery.

Appellant was

properly charged and convicted of theft ancl aqgravated
robbery.
B.
Appellant was not ent it le,l to a
dismissal of the theft cha11es because
under the evidence-hase<1 standard theft
was not a lesser incl11de,1 offense of
aggravated robbery.
-12-

If the defendant
',,.,
"' ,1,;
111

requests a jury instruction on

inclucled offenses, the proper standard requires an
uf the eviclence offered at trial.

ts

"h, tJo.

In

-~t-~t-~_v_.__B_a_k_~r_,

18245 (filecl September 21, 1983), the defendant was

d1argecl with one offense, burglary, but the defendant argued
that the evidence required a jury instruction on another
crime, criminal trespass, which he argued was a lesser
included offense of burglary.
The present case differs in several respects from
Baker on the lesser included offense issue.

In the case at

bar, the prosecution charged appellant with three crimes, but
appellant claims that, at the most, he could only be charged
with two crimes.

Baker was charged with only one crime, but

he sought a smaller sentence on a lesser inclucled offense
theory.

Appellant's request at trial also differs slightly

from the jury instruction request made by Baker.
did not

Appellant

request a jury instruction on a lesser inclucled

offense.

Insteaa, appellant made a motion to Clismiss the

theft charge because appellant argued theft was a lesser
incluaea offense of aggravated robbery, ana therefore,
appellant could not be convicted of both the "greater" and the
"lesser" crimes.

The motion was denied at trial and at

sentencing, and appellant was found guilty of theft and
"'Jqr,1vated robbery.
Tile clefendant
on lesser

in

_f2_a_k_~r_

include(! offenses.

made a motion to clismiss.

requested a jury instruction

The appellant in the case at bar

In each case, the Clefendants were
-13-

seeking the same result

hasec1 on the

rationale: a defenda11t can he"'

1_1):1»'

or the "lesser" ctime hut

rit

issue on lesser

i ,·t_ ed

huth

of

incltH1Prl offense
t hr:

c·1imPs.

11

er i

qreat 0r"

rhF' stan<li1trl

fnt

standard should not
appellant's argument

apply.

is that of analyzing

1'espnndent

~owever,

it

determining when a crime

lesser included offense of another

the evidence offered at trial.

':-1 1

Recause the

inclucfr>rl ,,ffr11scs w,1s raised hy appC'llant,

might be ar0uerl that
is a

not

lrsscr

submits that

even under

this

this standarrl,

lacks merit.

The evirlence-based standard

is followerl

in cases

when the evidence and circumstances 1ustify:
When an appellant makes an issue of a
refusal to instruct on included offenses,
we will survey the evidence, anrl the
inferences, which admit of rational
deduction, to determine if there exists
reasonable basis upon which a conviction
of the lesser offense coulrl rest.
[Footnote omitterl.]
~-t~~-~u_g_h_EC_r_t_z,

Utah, S 5 0 P. 2rl 17 s,

evidence based standarrl
~

76-1-402(4)

17 fi ( 19 76).

Th is

is incorporated in Utah Corle Ann.

(1953), as amended,

which provides:

The court shall not be obligaterl to
charge the jury with respect to an
included nffense unless there is a
rational basis for a verrlict acquitting
the defendant of the offense charged and
convicting him of the included offense.
Included offenses are rlefined
~

76-1402(3)(1953),

in lllah Cncle Ann.

as ilrnenclerl,

w'1irl1 ';ays that

included in a charged offense when:

-14-

an offense is

(a)
It is established by proof of
the same or less than all the facts
required to establish the commission of
\-he offen.se charged; or
(b)
I t constitutes an attempt,
.solicitation, conspiracy, or form of
preparation to commit the offense charged
or an offense otherwise included therein;
or
(c)
It is specifically designated by
a statute as a lesser included offense.
As in

-~t_a_1:_EC__':_~_~a_ke~,

Utah, No. 18245 (filed

September 21, 1983), this case arguably involves the
definition in (3)(a), which requires an analysis of the facts
at trial.
If the same facts tend to prove elements
of more than one statutory offense, then
the offenses are related under ~ 76-1-402.
The application of~ 76-l-402(3)(a) will
thus require some reference to the
statutory elements of the offenses
involved in order to determine whether
given facts are "required to establish the
commission of the offense charged."
This
requirement that there exist some overlap
in the statutory elements of allegedly
"included" offenses would prevent the
argument that totally unrelated offenses
could be deemed included simply because
some of the evidence necessary to prove
one crime was also necessary to prove the
other.
[W]here two offenses are
related because some of their statutory
elements overlap, and where the evidence
at trial of the greater offense includes
proof of some or all of those overlapping
elements, the lesser offense is an
included offense under subsection (3)(a}.
~t_a_t_e__v_.__R_a_k_e_r_,

I_d_., slip op. at 9 (emphasis in original).

If an offense is included within the meaning of

-15-

[u]nder ~ 76-l-4n2(4l, the cn11ti t''
obligated tn i11st 1 cJ1:t ' " ' I h" leo,c;1't
offense only if the evi,Je11cc offe1<'d
provides a "tat1onal has1s f,-" a verdirt
acquitting the defenlant 11f the nff<-ense
charged and cnnvi,-ti11q hi111 nf the included
offense."
Id.

'T'here are two situations when the trial court must give a

jury instruction on lesser
defendant's request.

included offenses upon the

The first

situation is "[w]hen the
i f there is a

elements of two offenses overlap .

sufficient quantum of evidence to" acquit him of the greater
offense.

~t_~t_e_.2_~_Ba~~r_,

Id. , s 1 i r op. at 1 O.

situation is "when the evidence

The second

is ambiguous and therefore

susceptible to alternative interpretations, and one
alternative would permit acquittal of the greater offense and
convict ion of the lesser."
This appeal

Id.

involves a motion by appellant that

theft must be dismissed because it

is a lesser included

offense of aggravated robbery.

is the State's posit ion

It

that under the evidence-based standard the same facts did not
prove elements of both theft and aggravated robbery.

The

elements of the these crimes are different, as discussed in
Point

IA, and that no elements nf the crimes overlap.
The same facts were nor

aggravated robbery.

Appellant

usecl to prove theft ann

committed aqqravaten robbery

when the wedning rings were taken

from Lorna Hc,lland's

fingers.

"nlent i0nal

a

It was the unlawful and

firearm, of personal property frnm

against her will,

l~rna

taking, by usinq

Holland's person

accomplished by means of force or fear.

-16-

At

that
·1

roint, the aggravated robbery was only committed against

nci Hol lancl.

, 1 ' ' "'"l

r1,,rt

The aggravated robbery was not committed

Holland at that roint

in time because nothing was

t .iken from "his person, or [from his]
See Utah Code Ann.

~

immediate presence."

76-6-301 (1953), as amended.

Thefts were thereafter committed against both Lorna
and Bert Holland.

The separate offense of theft was committed

when appellant went into other areas of the house, out of the
immediate presence of Lorna and Bert Holland, and obtained
unauthorized control over property of the Hollands.
Because of the presence element

("from his person,

or immediate presence") in aggravated robbery, different facts
were required to support the conviction for that crime.

Theft

does not have such an element and different evidence (items
taken from other rooms of the home) was used to support the
theft convict ion.
Respondent can find no Utah cases which define
"immediate presence".

The prevailing view seems to be that

the property does not need to be attached to the victim in any
literal sense for property to be taken from his "immediate
presence."

!:_e_o_p_l_e__':._.__l'!_~o-~e_,

13 Mich. App. 320, 164 N.W.

2d

4 2 3 ( 19h8) ; _s_t_a_t_e_2_·__M_c_~ona_l_i, Wash. , 4 4 3 P. 2a 6 51 ( 196 3 l ;
_L_a_n_<":_a_s_t_e_r__v_.__~t_a_t_e_, Okla. Crim., 554 P.2d 32 (1976).

Taking

propPrty from one room while a victim was secured in another
1•·<>111

was takinq property from his immediate presence.

v_.__c:_a_m_p_b_e_l_l_, 41 Del. 34 2, 22 A. 2d 390 ( 1941).

State

An automobile

lHkPn from a garage ("the curtilage of the home") was from the

-17-

immediate presence anrl possession of the owner, while the
Rtdle_y _v_.

Crim.

219, lR

P.~d

2d 632, 50 Cal.

281

Rptr.

(101'1;

687

PP0f'lP

v.

:;tate, S4 l""lkla.

RilUE't,

241

Cill.

Tip[»

(l%F,).

If this Court rlecirles that

"immerliate presence"

includes the various rooms in a home,

then the evirlence of

taking property from other pairs oft.he Hollancls'

home is also

evidence of aggravated robbery ancl not eviclence of theft.
the Court

finCls that all the eviclence

is not

If

separable into

the two crimes, then respondent alrees that the theft
conviction should be dismisserl.
Appellant also contenCls that the crimes were all
part

of a sing le criminal episode and that

punished for

both the theft ancl aggravated robbery offenses.

A "single criminal episode"
~

77-401-1

relatecl

he cannot be

is defined

in Utah Code Ann.

(1953) as amendecl, as "all conrluct which is closely

in time and

is incident to an attempt or an

accomplishment of a single criminal objective."
[W]hen the same act of a rlefendant under a
s1ngfe-cr1m-rnal-ep1sorle shall establish
offenses which may be punisherl in
different ways unrler Clifferent provisions
of this code, the act shall he punishable
under only one such provision; an
acquittal or conviction and sentence under
any such provision bars a ptosecution
unCler any other such prov is itJn.
Utah Code Ann.

1;

76-l-402(l)(l9Sl), as amenrlerl

(emphasis

adderl).
A defendant can he prosecuterl for
criminal violations ar i si n'l out

•lf

- lR-

t ht·•

Sd1n0

twn or more
act or

transaction.

-~t-~t_e__v_·--~~m_e_~,

Rloclr~h_lJ_r_q_e_r__v_.__u_n_i_t_e_d__s_t_a_t_e__:~•

!'"ll,,rl

Utah, 631 P.2d 854 (1981).

In

284 u.s. 299, 304 (1932), the

Stcites Supreme Court stated:
The applicable rule is that, where the
same act or transaction constitutes a
violation of two distinct statutory
provisions, the test to be applied to
determine whether there are two offenses
or only one is whether each provision
re~uires proof of an additional fact which
the other does not.

If each crime requires proof that the other does not, the
~~~c:_~b_l!_t_9~__!:_

test is satisfied even though there is some

overlap in the proof offered to establish the crimes.
v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
-------

Brown

In Albernaz v. United States,

450 U.S. 333 (1981), the united States Supreme Court followed
the

~~~c:_kbul:jl~__!:_

test and upheld the defendant's convictions

for conspiracy to import marijuana and conspiracy to
distribute marijuana in a case involving only a single
agreement or conspiracy.

The statutes involved in

Albe~ri__~~·

the Court said, proscribed two different ends, distribution as
opposed to import at ion.
As in

Albe__r_~,

the objectives for punishment of the

crimes in the present case are different from one another.
theft, the punishment aims to prohibit one person from
obtaining control of another's property without the owner's
per miss ion.

In aggravated robbery, the criminal justice

system seeks to prohibit two acts:
fr~n

the taking of property

another and the use of force to get the property.

Recause the use of force

in aggravated robbery involves a
-19-

In

greater danger to human life than the simple unauthorized
control of another's propett'/ i.n thf' 1·ri11" of theft,
criminal code defines d1tferent lv

tl1c,

r'lement

s

the

and punishmc·11t'

for these crimes.
In Utah, convictions of crimes iHisrng out of the
same criminal episode are not

prohibiterl under the sinqle

criminal episode provisions where there are distinct crimes,
seeking different criminal objectives.
Utah 2d 35, 368 P.2d 2fi2 (1962)
~·--l"._~c_12_1_~,

Utah, 584 P.2d Rfil

~t_a_t_e__v_.__J_o_~e2,

(burglary and larceny);
(1978)

State

(agyravated robbery and

aggravated kidnapping); _s_t_<:_t_EO__v_.__c:_C!_LJ_C_h_, Utah, fi35
(1981)

11

P.2d 89

(aggravated sexual assault, kidnapping and forcible

sodomy).

In crimes against the person (as contrasted with

crimes against property), a single criminal act or episode may
constitute as many offenses as there are victims.
James, Utah,

631 P.2d 854 (l'lRl).

Respondent

State v.

urges that the

crimes of theft and aggravated robbery were shown by

differe~

acts and that aggravated robbery was committed a'Jainst Lorna
Holland, while theft was committed against Lorna and Bert
Hol lancl.
The single criminal episode provisions are similar
to the double jeopardy prohibitions.

The rlouble jeopardy

clauses in the United States Constitution, Amend. v,l

1

"[N]or shall any perso11 he c;11hJect for the
same offense to he twice put in jeopardv of life or
limb

-2n-

in the lltah Constitution, art. I, Ii 122, cind in the Utah
r'n<lr

of Crirninal Proceriure, Utah Corie Ann. Ii

'l-f;(/l(,il(l9S3) as ilmenrien,3 forbiri the State from
,,.,,,,at<>rl attemrts to convict a riefenriant to protect him from
lh~

hazarris of trial and possible conviction more than once

for an alleqeri offense.

!'1_c_~_i_!_2._·__Hay_w_a_r_:'!_,

Utah, No. 18650

(filed June 9, 1983).
However, convictions of several crimes arising out
of the same criminal episode may not always be barred under
clouble jeopardy provisions.

~_a_t_e_2_'.__~o_s_':•

TJtah, 598 P.2d 342

(1979)(carrying loaderi firearm in a vehicle, marijuana
possession and possession of a firearm by a convicted person).
The double jeopardy rule protects against subsequent
prnsecut ion

o_n_}_y~o_r_ _!._h_e_s_a_m~~f_e_n_s_r:_.

~ate

v_'.__H_arr_i_2, 30

Utah 2d 354, 517 P.2d 1313 ( 1974).
nouble jeopardy therefore does not prevent
multiple convictions for multiple offenses
arising from a single criminal episode.
Likewise, offenses committed against
multiple victims are not the same, for
double jeopardy purposes even though
they may arise from the same criminal
episode.
-~t_a_t_e__v_'.__~o:_m_e_~,

Utah, 631 P.2d 854, 856 (1981)

(footnotes

omit tea).
The United States Supreme Court recently approved
the the imposition of cumulative punishments for two or more

t Ile

samt'

"[N]or .shall
same.: of tense."

any person be tv1ice put in jeopardy for

"No person shall he put twice in jeopardy for the

offense

.

"

-21-

statutorily defined offenses which constitute the "same" crime
under the

~-l_oc~~urg_e_!_

, 103 S.Ct. 673

test.

In Missouri
v. Hunter,
- -- -------------

Tl.

-

( 1983), the Court held that

,~.

s0ntences for

both first-degree robbery and armed criminal action in a
single trial did not violate double jeopardy provisions where
the

legislature specifically authorized the cumulative

punishment under two statutes.

The court said that in a

single trial, double jeopardy does no more than prevent the
sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the
legislature intended.

In the present case, the appellant has

been subjected to only one trial and "his right to be free
from multiple trials for the same offense has [not] been
violated."

!:!._i_~souri:__v_.__l:!_l'._~t-~~·

_!_d_., at 678.

Under the evidence-based standard, theft

is not a

lesser included offense of aggravated robbery in this case
because different evidence in this case was used to support
the two convictions. There was no rational basis for
acquitting defendant of the greater offense (aggravated
robbery), and convicting him of the included offense (theft).
Instead, there was sufficient evidence, and different
evidence, to find appellant guilty of both crimes.

POINT II
THERE WAS SUFF'ICEN'T' E'JI lJE:N\f: PRP.SENTED AT
TRIAL TO SUPPORT APPEL LAW!" S CONVICTIONS.

Appellant claims the evidence was insufficent to
support the verdicts of aggravaterl b1irglary, aggravated
·-2 2-

robbery and theft.

To prevail on this claim, the burden rests

nn ilpf1el lant to show on appeal that reasonable minds
,,,,,., sc;ar ily entertain il reasonable doubt that appellant
<'ommitten the crime.

s_t_a_t_e__v_._ __l~i,_l_s_o_r:i,, Utah, 565 P.2d 66

( 1977).
In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, the
evidence need not refute contrary allegations made by
appellant if the vernict is supported by substantial evidence.
~t_c:,t__~_v_.__l:,':_"2_":•

all

TJtah, 606 P. 2d 229 ( 1980).

The evidence, and

inferences that may reasonably be drawn therefrom, is to

be viewed in the light most favorable to the fact finder's
verdict.

~-a_t_e__v~

Gar_c_i_..":, Utah, 663 P.2d 60 (1983); Sta_t_e_ _y_:_

Gorlick, Utah, 605 P.2d 761 (1979).

-------

This Court recently summarized the standards to be
applied in reviewing claims of insufficient evidence in State
v_.__M_c_~a_r_?_e_l_1:.• Utah, 652 P.2d 942, 945 (1982):
This Court will not lightly overturn the
findings of a jury. We must view the
evidence properly presented at trial in
the light most favorable to the jury's
verdict, and will only interfere when the
evidence is so lacking and insubstantial
that a reasonable man would not possibly
have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable
doubt. We also view in a light most
favorable to the jury's verdict those
facts which can be reasonably inferred
from the evidence presented to it.
"Thus,
intent to commit [a crime]
. may be
found from proof of facts which it
reasonably could be believed that such was
defendant's intent."
[Citations omitted.]
N'>t11ilhstandinCJ the presumptions in favor of the jury's
decision, the appellate court can review the sufficiency of
-23-

the evidence to support the verdict. In :?_t_a_t_e__v_.__i:_e_t_r_e_e, Utah,
659 P.2d 443 (1983), this Court stated:
The fabric of evidence against the
defendant must cover the gap between the
presumption of innocence and the ptoof <)f
guilt.
In fulfillment of its nuty to
review the evidence and all inferences
which may reasonably he drawn from it in
the light most favorable to the verdict,
the reviewing court will stretch the
evidentiary fabric as far as it will go.
But th is does not mean that the court can
take a speculative leap across a remaining
gap in order to sustain a vei:dict.
The
evidence, stretched to its utmost limits,
must he sufficient to prove the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
In any case where the sufficiency of the evidence is
challenged, it is imperative that the totality of the facts
and circumstances be reviewed and considered rather than
isolated portions of it.

Yet appellant, chooses to focus

almost exclusively on the credibility of the testimony of the
two eyewitness victims, Bert and Lorna Holland.
Admittedly, theii: testimony was important to the
State's case.

However, their testimony must be viewed in its

proper context to3ethei: with all of the evidence adduced at
trial.

In addition, the ci:edihility of witnesses is an issue

for the jury.

~ta~_':._:__1:_C?._m_e_r_~,

lltah, 5'i4 P.2d 216 (1976).

Accordingly, when the total evidence in this case is viewed in
the light most favorable to the jury's vei:dicts, thei:e is
sufficient evidence to support appellant's convictions.
Appellant claims thei:e is insufficient evidence
because (1)

Mr. Holland could not positively pick appellant

out of a photogi:aphicc display and
-24-

(2)

Mrs. Bolland

positively picked a photograph of a person other than
'il'P"llant

in a separate photo display

(appellant's brief,

A complete and careful review of the entire record
rPveals that the identification evidence was merely one piece
of the State's total evidentiary picture.

In State v.

Utah, 533 P.2d 872, 87fi (1975), the Court

r_h_r_i_!3_t_e~__l'!_·

said:

.it may well be that certain facts of
the evidence, considered separately, coul
he regarded as not inculpatory, and thus
be vulnerable to the accused's claim that
it does not connect him with the crime.
However, the law does not require that the
separate bits of evidence he viewed in
isolation for it is proper to take
whatever fragments of proof that can be
found and piece them together with the
reasonable inferences to be drawn
therefrom in order to fill in the whole
mosaic of the crime.
see also

~tat_~_':_.__Malmr_~~~·

~o_l_b_e_r_d_i_n_SL,

Utah, 649 P.2d 56 (1982),

~t_ate

v__'._

30 Utah 2d 257, 5lfi P.2d 359 (1973).

Incriminating evidence, which the jury had but which
appellant overlooks, was the testimonies of James Nix Rafal
and Jay Kenneth Sanchez.

Rafal and Sanchez were accomplices

with appellant when the crimes were committed against the
Hollands.

Rafal's and Sanchez's testimonies alone, even

though they were accomplices to the crime, would be sufficient
to sustain appellant's convictions.

Utah Code Ann.

~

77-17-7

(1951), as amended, provides that a "conviction may be had on
the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice."
·nth this

statut>0, the trial

In conformity

judge instructed the jury on the

testimony of an accomplice:
-25-

You are instructed that an accomplice
is one who unites with a nut her peor snn in
the commission of a crime, voluntarily and
with comr1(Jf"'1 int E. nt.
An rlCl'Ofll~i l i(''' df)<•s
not become incompPt('nt as (, witness

because of part icipal ion in Uie er im0
charged.
()n the contrary, thE' law of the
state of Utah pt,n'!ldes that a convict inn
may be had on the uncorrohorated testimony
of an accomrlice.
The iury, however,
should keep in mind that such testimony is
to be received with caution.
Jury Instruction Number 19 (R. lln).
At trial, ,1ames Nix Raf al, who was ciranted immunity
for his testimony, testified about the events which occurred
on December 15, 1980, at 6773 South Olivet Drive in Salt Lake
City.

Rafal said Nick Smith and Jay Sanchez arrived at his

home at about 8:30 p.m.

('T'.

The three men were

14n-141).

planning to rob a house that Smith said had "some coke in it
and some papers"

('T'.

142).

They then picked up appellant and

drove to the Holland residence after obtaining a shotgun (T.
145).

Rafal and appellant went to the home while Smith and

Sanchez waited in the car

('T'.

146).

When the Hollands denied

knowledge of "the coke and the papers," Rafal said he and
appellant tied their hands with duct tape (T. 147).

Raf al

said they searched the house for valuables before they left
( T.

148).
Rafal's testimony is supportPrl hy Sanchez, who also

received immunity from prosecution.

,';anchez was living at the

Bonneville Corrections Center in Salt Lake City in
1980 (T. 182).

Decemb~r

On the night of Dr"cemher 15, 1980, he ohtainc'

a sponsor to allow him to leave the CrJr
-26-

r'-'<'l

ions Center

('T'.

1R1) .

Sanchez met Smith and they went to Rafal's home (T.

I 'I 4 I •

Sanchez said Rafal went with them to appellant's home

111'' l lant

also qol

into the car

"'"c<>r•dl"l tn the J-lolland

commit
w0nt

a robbery (T.

(T.

l8'i).

They then

residence where they planned to

l8fi).

Sanchez said 1'.lafal and appellant

into the house and committed the crimes (T. 1SJ6).
In addition to the testimony of these two

accomplices,
~lr.

Mr. and Mrs.

Holland also testified at trial.

Holland told about the crimes and he identified appellant

at trial as one of the men who entered his home on December 5,
1980 (T.

46).

Mr. Holland said he was asked to look at some

photngraphs about one week after the crimes occurred (T.

49).

f!e was not able at the time to make a positive identification
(T. 50).

Appellant's photoqraph was not among those in the

display.

While the police investigation continued, the

Hollands moved to Idaho and they later participated in another
photograph identification attempt

in March 1982 (T. 56, 83).

Mr. Holland made a positive identification of Rafal at the
time (T. 55, 58, 92).

He also choose two photographs which

possibly were of the other assailant

(T. 5'i, 92).

Appellant's

photograph was one of the photographs Aert Holland thought
c'°luld be of the other assailant

(T. 'i'i, 92).

At trial. Bert Holland positively identified
app0l]ant
1"

11

rn1

as one of the assailants (T. 46).

ncit y 1,e,11 i nq, Bert

At the

J-lolland testified that he was 75

I"'' •Ynt sure that appellant was one of the assailants (T. 53) •
' 1nclPt

cross examination at trial, Bert Holland said he
-27-

remained 75 percent certain that appellant

was on0 of the

assailants (T. 54).
The testimonies of Rafal, Sanchez anrl R0rt
/'\fter

are also corroborated hy Lorna Hol lanrl.
about

the crimes, Mrs. Hollanrl

testifyin<J

identified appellant

the perpetrators of the crime (T. fi7).

Hollan,J

When asked

as one of
if his

appearance harl changed since the day of the crimes, she sairl,
"His eyes look the same.
6 7).

Don't think it changed a lot"

(T.

She also said she could not make a positive

identification when Detective Daryle Onrlrak showed her some
photographs about one week after the crimes (T.

fi8).

At the

photograph identification in Irlaho, she made an iclentification
of one photograph she thought was one of the assailants (T.
69, 93-94).

The picture she choose was of Robert Taylor, who

apparently was not
At trial,

involved with the er ime (T. 'l4).
Lorna Hollanrl irlentified appellant as one

of the assailants (T. fi7).

At the preliminary hearing, she

also identified appellant as an assailant
cross examination, she was asked

(T.

70).

if she had positively

identified appellant at the preliminary hearing
said appellant

Unrler

(T.

72).

She

looked similar to one of the persons inside her

house and "I was very sure that was him, but I don't suppose:
could say a hundrerl percent.
Both Mr. and Mrs.
not

positive"

(T.

72).

Holland testifierl that they c01Jld

be 100 percent certain that

persons who entered their
the

Not

appellant

homr>.

However, this does not make

identification evidence iricnnclusi\le,
-2R-

was one of the

Mr. Holland was

7'

percent sure (T. 'i4) and Mrs. Holland was "very sure that was
1, i 1n"
,,1

( T.

1 hr~

7 2).

Moreover, Rafal and Sanchez were also present

er ime scene ancl positively identifie<'l appellant as one

,Jf the persons who committed the crimes.

From all of the evidence presented, the jury could
fairly anrl reasonably conclude that appellant committed
aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery and theft.

This Court

should not disturb the convictions.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, respondent urges that the
convictions and sentences of appellant be affirmed.
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